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Abstract
This study examines the influence of corporate board composition in the form of representa-
tion of outside independent directors on firm economic performance in Bangladesh. Two hypothe-
ses are developed to examine the relationship among composition of board memberships includ-
ing independent directors and firm performance. An observation of 274 Bangladeshi firm-years is
used in the study. A linear regression analysis is used to test the hypotheses. Results reveal that
the outside (independent) directors cannot add potential value to the firm’s economic performance
in Bangladesh. The idea of the introduction of independent directors may have benefits for greater
transparency, but the non-consideration of the underlying institutional and cultural differences in
an emerging economy such as Bangladesh may not result in economic value addition to the firm.
The findings provide an insight to the regulators in their quest for harmonization of international
corporate governance practices.
76
Board Composition and Firm Performance: 
Evidence from Bangladesh
Afzalur Rashida
Anura De Zoysab
Sudhir Lodh**b
and
Kathy Rudkinb
Abstract
This study examines the influence of corporate board composition in 
the form of representation of outside independent directors on firm 
economic performance in Bangladesh. Two hypotheses are developed 
to examine the relationship among composition of board memberships 
including independent directors and firm performance. An observation 
of 274 Bangladeshi firm-years is used in the study. A linear regression 
analysis is used to test the hypotheses. Results reveal that the outside 
(independent) directors cannot add potential value to the firm’s 
economic performance in Bangladesh. The idea of the introduction 
of independent directors may have benefits for greater transparency, 
but the non-consideration of the underlying institutional and cultural 
differences in an emerging economy such as Bangladesh may not result 
in economic value addition to the firm. The findings provide an insight 
to the regulators in their quest for harmonization of international 
corporate governance practices.
JEL Classification: G34, G39 
Keywords: Board Composition, Independent directors, Firm 
Performance, Bangladesh.
**  Corresponding author: siodh@uow.edu.au. 
a University of Southern Queensland, Australia
b University of Wollongong, Australia
Rashid, De Zoysa, Lodh and Rudkin: Board Composition and Firm Performance
77
1 Introduction
Bangladesh actively pursues a regulatory environment that aligns its 
corporations with international accepted corporate governance best practice. 
This study challenges the taken-for-granted assumption in this strategy 
that corporate governance principles derived in advanced economies can be 
assumed to transfer unproblematically to emerging economies. Rather it is 
argued when examining corporations in the Bangladeshi context, where the 
legal form of the corporation is comparable with that of advanced economies, 
contextual features undermine such considerations. 
A sample of 274 Bangladeshi firms is observed to determine the 
relationship among board composition, independent directors and firm 
performance. We argue that with respect to corporate board composition, the 
representation of outside independent directors on boards in Bangladesh 
cannot add economic value to Bangladeshi firms. 
The concept of public limited companies is universal. Public limited 
companies emerged in the mid-nineteenth century as a form of business 
ownership that enabled a greater potential to raise capital and to limit 
investors’ risk to their respective equity investments. Historically public 
limited companies were controlled by their owners, either through direct 
management or through direct control of management by owners (Mintzberg, 
1984). However, as the size of limited companies grew, direct owner involvement 
was no longer practical. With the increase and dispersion of ownership and the 
cessation of direct involvement in corporations’ management, a profession of 
management emerged (Berle and Means 1932). Consequently, the ownership 
control of the modern corporation is vested in the hands of management leading 
to a so-called managerial hegemony (Mintzberg, 1984). This creates an agency 
problem of aligning the interests of shareholders with that of management.
To mitigate the agency problem, Rose (2005) argues that the corporate 
board plays a key role in supervising management and aligning their interests 
with the interests of shareholders. The board is considered to be a primary 
internal corporate governance mechanism (Brennan, 2006), as the board 
monitors and supervises management, and gives management strategic 
guidelines. It may act to review and ratify management’s proposals (Jonsson, 
2005). A board works to enhance the firm performance and enact legally vested 
responsibilities and fiduciary duties (Zahra and Pearce II, 1989). The board’s 
expertise can also spot problems early and may “blow the whistle” (Salmon, 
1993). There is a lacuna of studies as to whether the composition of boards of 
directors can meet these stated responsibilities in the same ways in differing 
market contexts and jurisdictions in which they operate.
Corporate governance convention adopted from advance markets’ 
codes and principles in fulfilling the role of a board require executive and 
non-executive directors to work together. It is assumed that boards without 
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non-executive directors act as a rubber stamp, and are dominated by the 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO), and are plagued with conflicts of interests 
(Weidenbaum, 1986). Jensen (1993, p 421) argues that the “board culture is 
an important component of board failure”.
The wave of corporate scandals, for example, Enron, WorldCom 
and HIH lead to the question as to what composition of board is best able 
to monitor management (Mizruchi, 2004, p 614; Brick et al., 2006, p 421). 
Enron, WorldCom and HIH management were all involved in questionable 
accounting practices which were undetected by their respective boards (Main, 
2002; Lawrence, 2004; Kaplan and Kiron, 2004; Solomon, 2007). Regulatory 
corporate governance reports and codes; for example, Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
2002 in United States; Cadbury Report 1992, Higgs Report 2003 and Smith 
Report 2003 in the United Kingdom and CLERP 9 and the Ramsay Report 
2001 in Australia advocate many boardroom reforms. The Higgs Committee 
recommended the independence of outside directors be tested. There is a 
widespread response to the Higgs Committee Recommendations (Kirkbride 
and Letza, 2005). Consequently, many countries around the world undertook 
corporate governance reforms. 
As part of reform movements, in 2006 Bangladesh introduced a hybrid 
regulation which is nomenclature as the Corporate Governance Notification 
(CGN). This CGN follows a western model requiring appointments on a 
corporate board of at least one-tenth of the total directors subject to a minimum 
of one as an independent director (Rashid and Lodh 2008). Non-compliance 
requires an explanation. This regulation in Bangladesh is of interest because 
over the past decades an overwhelming proportion of corporate governance 
literature has concentrated on advanced economies with developed financial 
and legal systems (Ararat and Yurtoglu, 2006). Although there exist several 
studies on corporate governance in less developed and emerging economies 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Sarkar et al. 1998; Asian Development Bank 2000; 
Rwegasira 2000; Gibson, 2003; Denis and McConnell, 2003; Machold and 
Vasudevan, 2004; Yammeeri et al. 2006), in the context of Bangladesh there 
are very few studies on corporate board practices and governance. This study 
extends the literature on corporate board practices and firm performance 
by providing evidence from this emerging economy. In particular, this study 
attempts to investigate whether board composition in the form of outside 
independent directors as considered in advanced systems, can influence firm 
economic performance in Bangladesh.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
background literature of this study. Section 3 elaborates on the institutional 
background of corporate board practices in Bangladesh. Section 4 discusses the 
methodology and definitions of variables for the analysis. Section 5 presents 
empirical results. Section 6 discusses the limitations of this study and the 
conclusions drawn.
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Background Literature
The United Kingdom Cadbury Report (Cadbury, 1992, p. 15) defined corporate 
governance as “the system by which companies are directed and controlled”, 
including board practices and composition and their relationship to firm 
performance. Agency literature views management as opportunistic (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976) arguing that an individual is self-interested and self-
opportunistic, rather than altruistic. It assumes that due to the separation of 
ownership and control, managers (agents) will not align their interests in the 
firm with that of the owners, being driven by self-interest. Unless restricted 
from doing otherwise, management will undertake self-serving activities that 
could be detrimental to the economic welfare of the principals (Deegan, 2006, 
p 225). It is argued that boards comprising outside independent directors will 
counter the agency problem by being able to monitor any self interested actions 
by managers (Zahra and Pearce II, 1989; Bathala and Rao, 1995; Nicholson 
and Kiel, 2007; Kaymak and Bektas, 2008). This may in turn enhance firm 
performance (Luan and Tang, 2007). The agents will be motivated, however, 
to work in the interests of owners only if there is an oversight incentive to do 
so in the form of independent directors who set the tone for less opportunistic 
behaviour by managers. It is argued that in so doing, outside independent 
directors may provide more skills and knowledge for the benefit of the 
corporation.
Earlier Studies on Board Composition
It is widely debated in the corporate governance literature as to whether board 
composition in the form of representation of outside independent directors may 
add any economic value to the firm (Kesner et al., 1986; Hermalin and Weisbach, 
2003; Petra, 2005). Prior research on board composition mainly focused on 
firms in advanced economies (Guest, 2008). Studies for example by Kaplan and 
Reishus (1990), Byrd and Hickman (1992), Brickley et al. (1994), and Beasley 
(1996) found a positive impact from appointing outside independent directors 
onto the board. Kesner et al. (1986) found that, although independent directors 
are not involved in illegal acts, adding outside independent directors cannot 
lessen a firm’s illegal acts. Fernandes (2005) documented that the firms with 
non-executive directors have less agency problems and have a better alignment 
of shareholders and managers’ interests. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) show 
that the firm share price goes up when an additional outside director is 
appointed. Denis and Sarin (1999), in a study using a time-series analysis over 
a 10-year period, found that the changes in ownership and board structure are 
correlated with one another. Changes in ownership and board structure are 
strongly related to top executive turnover, prior share price performance, and 
corporate control threats. Cotter et al. (1997) studied the role of independent 
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outside directors during takeover attempts by tender offer. They found that 
independent outside directors enhance target shareholder’s gains from tender 
offers and a majority of independent directors are more likely to use resistance 
strategies to enhance shareholders’ wealth.
The empirical evidence of outside independent directors and firm 
performance is mixed. Some studies, such as Schellenger et al. (1989), Daily 
and Dalton (1992), Tian and Lau (2001) and Luan and Tang (2007) found 
that having more outside independent directors on the board improves firm 
economic performance. Other studies including Baysinger and Butler (1985), 
Chaganti et al. (1985), Rechner and Dalton (1986), Zahra and Stanton (1988), 
Fosberg (1989), Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Barnhart et al. (1994), Grace 
et al. (1995), Barnhart and Rosenstein (1998), Dalton et al. (1998), Dalton and 
Daily (1999), Davidson III and Rowe (2004), Fernandes (2005), and Cho and 
Kim (2007) could not find any relationship between board composition in the 
form of representation of outside independent directors and firm performance. 
Baysinger and Butler (1985) argued that these differences in findings 
may occur due to various factors such as corporate law, managerial talent, 
capital markets and the internal capital structure of the firm. In addition, 
Zahra and Pearce II (1989) pointed to several reasons for such inconsistencies, 
as summarized by Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996, p 239). These include the 
consideration of several contextual factors; life cycle, corporate strategy and 
effective interaction among board members in decision making. Finkelstein 
and Hambrick (1996) also argue that despite such variances, a board may 
indirectly influence the firm’s performance by quality of monitoring. Due to the 
high degree of diversity of the results of earlier studies on board composition 
and firm performance, Dalton and Daily (1999) viewed these results as ‘vexing’, 
‘contradictory’, ‘mixed’ and ‘inconsistent’.
As has been stated earlier, the CGN (2006) requires the appointment of at 
least one tenth of the total directors, subject to a minimum of one independent 
director. Given this requirement, there will be an imbalance of power between 
inside and outside directors, dependent upon the board size. A smaller board 
is manageable and plays a controlling function, whereas a larger board is non-
manageable and may have greater agency problems and may not be able to act 
effectively leaving management relatively free of being controlled (Chaganti 
et al., 1985; Jensen, 1993; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). Del Guercio et al. 
(2003) reveal that smaller boards with a higher proportion of independent 
directors are more effective. 
Why Outside Independent Directors?
Independent non-executive directors are appointed from outside and they 
should not have any material interest in the firm. Dalton and Daily (1999) and 
Fields and Keys (2003) argue that independent directors are appointed based 
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on their unique qualifications, expertise and experience. The view is that they 
may effectively influence the board’s decisions and ultimately add value to the 
firm. It is argued independent directors provide a unique monitoring function 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Bathala and Rao, 1995; Beasley,, 
1996). Farrar (2005) suggests independent directors play a useful role in 
strategic planning and risk management. It is also recognized that independent 
directors share the responsibility to monitor a firm’s financial performance. In 
so doing, they have authority to question problems of information asymmetry 
(Ozawa, 2006, p 104), and have the power to make recommendations on 
executive compensation and dismissal of the CEO following poor performance 
(Kesner et al., 1986; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996, p 225; Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2003).
The practicality of appointing independent directors is challenging. There 
is no consensus of a common definition of independent director as yet (Brennan 
and McDermott, 2004, p 326). They are neither employees of the company, 
nor have they any business relationship with the firm (Hulbert, 2003). If the 
appointment of independent directors is to achieve these intended functions, 
the appointment of such directors must be transparent and at arms’ length. 
However, such appointments can be controversial if there are questions as to 
the independence of appointments. It is possible that independent directors 
are known to the CEO or other inside directors prior to their appointments. 
The new outside board members who are proposed by inside board members 
may have personal relationships with them (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996, 
p 225). 
Arguments have been presented challenging the limitations of outside 
independent directors. Nicholson and Kiel (2007, p 588) argue that “inside 
directors live in the company they govern, they better understand the business 
than outside directors and so can make better decisions”. Their argument 
is one of information asymmetry between inside directors and outside 
independent directors. They argue that a lack of day to day inside knowledge 
may reduce the control role of the independent directors in the firm, and that 
the independent directors may fail to perform because of appropriate support 
by the inside directors (Cho and Kim, 2007). Brennan (2006) also questions 
the value of outside independent directors, as they may not be competent to 
perform their assigned tasks in that they are part-timers and do not have 
inside information of the firm. 
The problem of finding truly outside independent directors has been noted. 
Flanagan (1982) argues that 80 percent of the outside directors’ candidature in 
the United States is known by either the CEO or by other board members prior 
to their appointment. Patton and Baker (1987) and Jensen (1993) argue that 
outside directors are the creatures of CEOs and are more likely to be aligned 
with top management rather than that of the interests of shareholders, as 
top management have great influence over who sits on the board. However, 
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Brickley et al. (1994) argue that due to reputational concerns and fear of 
lawsuits, outside directors may be motivated to represent shareholders, but 
that the ability to issue commands and instructions by these directors is 
limited (McNulty and Pettigrew, 1996). Dayton (1984) argues that outside 
independent directors only monitor in the case of crisis. Outside independent 
directors may serve on too many boards (Core et al., 1999).
Institutional Background of Corporate Board Practices in Bangladesh
While corporate governance reforms in Bangladesh are consistent with 
global reforms concerning outside independent directors (cf., CGN 2006), 
the Bangladeshi institutional environment lags behind. Typically owners 
often have significant stakes of shares and dominate the board of directors. 
This form of governance is known as the ownership control approach and 
is in contrast to corporate governance practices that make use of outside 
independent directors. Highly concentrated ownership and consequential 
board influence can have dominating features where there exists a lack of 
takeover regulations, an inefficient market, and transaction costs associated 
with takeover processes. Corporate governance in Bangladesh is not without 
such characteristics. In Bangladesh, an absence of a liquid capital market and 
other dominant control mechanisms including compensation in the form of 
share options, are also major features. 
In general corporate boards in Bangladesh are one-tiered or management 
without the use of any supervisory board. Both executive and non-executive 
directors perform duties together in one organisational layer. This is not 
commonly seen in advanced systems of corporate governance. An indication 
of CEO duality in corporate board supervision is an example of such a one-
tiered structure. Similarly there exists CEO duality in some listed companies 
in Bangladesh.
Methodology and Definition of Variables
Methodology
The Securities and Exchange Commission Bangladesh (SECB) announced a 
corporate governance notification (CGN 2006). One of the requirements of that 
notification is to appoint outside independent directors onto boards, otherwise 
an explanation is needed for any non-compliance. Many firms subsequently 
complied with this guideline. Based on the availability of company annual 
reports, this study considers 90 non-financial firms listed on the Dhaka Stock 
Exchange (DSE) during the period 2005 to 2009. This represents 38.3% of the 
total DSE listed companies as at 31 December 2009. It comprises 61.6% of total 
non-financial companies; representing 55% (approximately) of the market 
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capitalization of total non-financial listed firms. A total of 274 observations 
are made for this study, as shown in Table 1. The sample consists of a variety 
of industries as shown in Table 2.
The audited financial reports from companies are the basis for obtaining 
accounting information including total assets, total liabilities and equities, net 
sales, net incomes, and operating incomes. The data for board composition and 
board size are obtained from directors’ reports. Market values of the closing 
share prices are also collected from the DSE web site and from the Monthly 
Review of the DSE.
Table 1:  
Sample Description
Year Number of firms in the sample Observed firm years
2005 90 10  
2006 90 90  
2007 90 90  
2008 90 78  
2009 90  6 
Total observations (Firm years) 274  
Table 2: 
 Industry classification of the sample
Industry Number of firms in the sample Observed firm years
 
Cement 3 9  
Ceramic 1 3  
Engineering 13 43  
Food and Allied 17 48  
Fuel and Power 2 5  
Jute 2 6  
Paper and Printing 3 9  
Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals 16 49  
Service and Real Estate 2 5  
Tannery 4 15  
Textile 23 69  
Miscellaneous  4 13 
Total 90 274
Based on the background literature, two hypotheses are stated as follows:
H1: There is a significant positive relationship between the board 
composition and firm performance.
84
AABFJ   |   Volume 4, no. 1, 2010
H2: There is a significant negative relationship between the board size 
and firm performance.
Variable Definitions
Dependent Variable: Firm Performance
Dependent variables in this study are the firms’ performances under different 
performance measures such as Return on Assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q (a market 
based performance measure). Consistent with Yammeesri and Lodh (2004), 
Yammeesri et al. (2006) and Rashid and Lodh (2008), ROA is calculated as 
‘Earnings Before Interest and Taxes’ (EBIT) scaled by the book value of total 
assets. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market value of the firm to the replacement 
cost of their assets.
Independent Variable: Board Composition
Board composition in this study refers to the percentage of membership held by 
the outside independent directors, which has been considered in prior studies 
(Rechner and Dalton, 1986; Zahra and Stanton, 1988). This satisfies the 
definition of an independent director as provided in the CGN 2006 issued by 
SECB. Independent variable BDCOM is used to denote the board composition.
Control Variables
The considered control variables are as follows; ownership structure, board 
size, CEO-duality, firm debt, firm size, firm age and firm growth. The shares 
of public limited companies in Bangladesh are not widely held. Apart from a 
few controlling ownerships by foreign investors and government and financial 
institutions, the public limited companies in Bangladesh are in general mainly 
controlled by family members who are founding sponsors and/or directors, 
leading to a high degree of ownership control. The company board is generally 
formed from the representation of these shareholdings. In our view, family 
directors or sponsors are highly influential in appointing any new director in 
Bangladesh. Therefore, ownership structure in Bangladesh has a significant 
impact on the board’s role of monitoring management, which in turn can 
influence firms’ performance. A control variable director shareholdings 
ownership (DIROWN) is considered for the percentage of shares owned by the 
directors or sponsors.
 A control variable board size (LOGBDSIZE) is considered to be the 
natural logarithms of total board members. Whether a CEO would have a 
great influence on board structure and its capacity to monitor management 
depends on the distribution of power between the chairperson of the board and 
the CEO (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). A control variable CEO-duality 
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(CEOD) is considered as a binary, which is equal to be one (1) if the CEO and 
chairperson positions are held by the same individual, otherwise zero (0). 
Firm debt may act as a disciplinary device to agency problems which 
ultimately can have influence on a firm’s performance (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Consistent with McConnell and Servaes (1990), Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996), Short and Keasey (1999) and Xu and Wang (1999), a control variable 
debt (DEBT) is also considered to identify the impact on firms’ performance. It 
is measured as the ratio of Total Debts to Total Assets. 
The firm size is an important variable because large firms can be influenced 
by having more capacity to generate internal funds (Short and Keasey, 1999), 
having a greater variety of capabilities (Majumdar and Chhibber, 1999), and 
having problems of coordination which may negatively influence performance 
(Williamson, 1967). The natural logarithm of Total Sales is considered as the 
firm size (LOGSIZE). 
Firm performance can also be influenced by the age of the firms. Older 
firms are likely to achieve greater efficiency by reducing costs than younger 
firms (Ang et al., 2000). The variable of age (LOGAGE) is defined here as the 
natural logarithm of years the firm is on the DSE. 
Regression Model Specification
In order to examine the relationship between board composition and firm 
performance, the following model is developed:
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Regression Model Specification
In order to exami  the relationship between board composition and firm performance, 
the following model is developed:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7it it it it it it it it itY BDCOMP DIROWN LOGBDSIZE CEOD DEBT LOGSIZE LOGAGEα β β β β β β β ε= + + + + + + + +
Where, 
• Yit is alternatively ROAit and Tobin’s Qit for ith firm at time t,
• BDCOMPit is the board composition, 
• DIROWNit is the percentage of shares owned by directors for ith firm at time t,
• LOGBDSIZEit is the board size for ith firm at time t,
• CEODit is the CEO duality for ith firm at time t,
• DEBTit is the debt ratio for ith firm at time t,
• LOGSIZEit is the firm size for ith firm at time t,
• LOGAGEit is the firm age for ith firm at time t,
• α is the intercept, βi is the regression coefficient of ith variable and εit is the composite 
error terms, and 
• The subscript i represents the different firms and t represents the different years.
Empirical Result
Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics of all variables used in the model are shown in Table 3 below:
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of the Sample
Variables N Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis
ROA 274 0.057 -1.494 0.287 0.132 -6.278 69.833
Tobin’s Q 274 1.290 0.335 6.226 0.769 2.566 9.873
BDCOMP 274 0.109 0.000 0.333 0.082 -0.077 -0.751
DIROWN 274 0.423 0.000 0.960 0.190 0.069 0.423
LOGBDSIZE 274 1.857 1.099 2.485 0.304 -0.269 -0.102
CEOD 267 0.416 0.000 1.000 0.494 0.344 -1.896
DEBT 274 0.774 0.073 5.619 0.629 4.061 22.483
LOGSIZE 274 5.459 -4.200 10.724 2.398 -0.937 1.132
LOGAGE 274 2.858 2.079 3.466 0.312 -0.082 -0.836
Where, 
•  Yit is alternatively ROAit and Tobin’s Qit for ith firm at time t, 
•  BDCOMPit is th  board comp sition, 
•  DIROWNit is the percentage of shares owned by directors for ith firm at 
time t, 
•  LOGBDSIZEit is the board size for ith firm at time t, 
•  CEODit is the CEO duality for ith firm at time t, 
•  DEBTit is the debt ratio for ith firm at time t, 
•  LOGSIZEit is the firm size for ith firm at time t,
•  LOGAGEit is the firm age for ith firm at time t, 
•  α is the intercept, bi is the regression coefficient of ith variable and eit 
is the composite error terms, and 
•  The subscript i represents the different firms and t represents the 
different years.
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Empirical Result
Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics of all variables used in the model are shown in Table 
3.
As per Table 3, average firm performance is 5.7% ranging from negative 
149.4% to 28.7% under the ROA performance measure, and 129% ranging from 
33.5% to 622.6% under Tobin’s Q performance measure. The average board 
composition is found to be 10.9% ranging from 0% to 33.33%. The average 
directors’ shareholding is found to be 42.3%, ranging from 0% to 96%. The 
average board size is 7 directors, ranging from a minimum of 3 directors to a 
maximum of 12 directors. On an average it shows that there is 41.7% incidence 
of CEO duality in the observed sample. The average Total Debt to Total Assets 
(DEBT) is 77.4% ranging from 7.3% to 561.9%. The average firm size is 5.459 
implying an average firms’ sales of Taka 234.86 million. The average firm age 
is 18 years ranging from 8 years to 32 years.
The results of the analysis carried out to examine the correlation between 
the explanatory variables and are presented in the correlation matrix in Table 
4, which demonstrates that none of the explanatory variables is correlated 
with another explanatory variable in the model. This is further confirmed by 
the scores of variance inflation factor (VIF) which quantifies the severity of 
multicollinearity in a regression analysis. A VIF value of ten is considered as 
a cut off value for multicollinearity (Gujarati, 2003). 
Table 3:  
Descriptive Statistics of the Sample
Variables  N Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Skewness Kurtosis
     Deviation
ROA 274 0.057 -1.494 0.287 0.132 -6.278 69.833
Tobin’s Q 274 1.290 0.335 6.226 0.769 2.566 9.873
BDCOMP 274 0.109 0.000 0.333 0.082 -0.077 -0.751
DIROWN 274 0.423 0.000 0.960 0.190 0.069 0.423
LOGBDSIZE 274 1.857 1.099 2.485 0.304 -0.269 -0.102
CEOD 267 0.416 0.000 1.000 0.494 0.344 -1.896
DEBT 274 0.774 0.073 5.619 0.629 4.061 22.483
LOGSIZE 274 5.459 -4.200 10.724 2.398 -0.937 1.132
LOGAGE 274 2.858 2.079 3.466 0.312 -0.082 -0.836
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The model is regressed using linear regression analysis by the SPSS (The 
Statistical Package for Social Science). The regression results are presented in 
Table 5. Results indicate that there is no significant relationship between board 
composition and firm performances in either measure. This implies that the 
outside independent directors cannot influence firms’ economic performance. 
The results also confirm that board size has a significant negative explanatory 
power in influencing firms’ performance under the ROA measure, but it shows 
a positive explanatory power in influencing firm performance under Tobin’s 
Q measure. This is indicative of information asymmetries between inside and 
outside directors. The results further indicate that rather, CEO-duality, Firm 
Debt and Firm Size all having significant explanatory power in determining 
firm’s performance under the market based performance measure. The results 
also show that the firm size has a significant positive explanatory power in 
determining firm’s performance in the ROA measure.
The relationship between outside directors and firms’ performance is 
not clear explicitly in case of developed economies (Judge et al., 2003). This 
study also supports this argument, finding that outside independent directors 
are good monitors but cannot add economic value to firms in Bangladesh. It 
should however be mentioned that the data were mainly collected from the 
companies’ annual reports which may have explanatory power for additional 
causes on true companies’ performance. Also, the data were collected from 
entities ignoring the underlying differences of their operations, as any two 
organisations are not the same. The extreme value of some observed variables 
such as EBIT and accumulated income of some firms may have further impacts 
on the results. The sample size could have influences on the results as firms 
were required to comply with the CGN (2006) notification.
Table 4:  
Correlation matrix of the explanatory variables
 BDCOMP DIROWN LOGBDSIZE CEOD DEBT LOGSIZE LOGAGE VIF
BDCOMP 1       1.266
DIROWN -.060 1      1.027
LOGBDSIZE .340** -.028 1     1.220
CEOD -.211** .136* -.111 1    1.100
DEBT -.123* -.030 -.033 .006 1   1.082
LOGSIZE .293** -.051 .258** -.084 -.321** 1  1.207
LOGAGE .237** .002 .248** -.219** .082 .086 1 1.143
 * At 5% level of significance and ** at 1% level of significance respectively.
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Discussion and Conclusion
This study examines the influence of board composition in the form of 
representation of outside independent directors on the firm’s economic 
performance in Bangladesh. It is revealed that there is no significant 
relationship between board composition in the form of representation of 
outside independent directors and firm performance, implying that the 
outside independent directors cannot add potential economic value to the 
firm in Bangladesh. It is also revealed that the board size has a significant 
Table 5:  
Board composition and firm performance  
under different performance measures 
This table presents the summary results of the board composition and 
firm performance under different performance measures. Column (a) and 
(b) represent the coefficients of performance measures. The t-values are 
presented in parentheses.
 Dependent Variables
 (a) ROA (b) Tobin’s Q
Intercept -.078 -1.798
 (-1.061) (-5.855)***
BDCOMP .144 0.418
 1.560 1.088
DIROWN .039 .020
 1.087 .132
LOGBDSIZE -.042 0.384
 (-1.724)* 3.765***  
CEOD .011 -.110
 .757 (-1.842)*
DEBT -.080 .886
 (-6.356)*** 16.966***
LOGSIZE .020 .049
 6.237*** 3.731***  
LOGAGE .045 .492
 1.934* 5.096***  
Adjusted R2 0.302*** 0.586***  
F-Statistic 17.468*** 54.887***
 
* At 10% level of significance, ** at 5% level of significance and *** at 1% level of significance 
respectively.
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negative influence on firm performance under accounting based performance 
measures, implying that there are information asymmetries between outside 
independent and other directors. Therefore, it is supportive that outside 
independent directors of Bangladeshi firms are not able to ensure the checks 
and balances of accountability and management activities as implied in the 
CGN in 2006. This is consistent with the Cadbury Report 1992 and the Higgs 
Report 2003 in the United Kingdom.
In our view, although independent outside directors, in general, do 
play an advisory role rather than adding economic value, there is a need for 
further exploration as to whether independent directors can provide effective 
judgmental contributions to firms. From the analysis we would like to 
conclude that the introduction of a hybrid regulation (such as CGN 2006) may 
not be an appropriate notification to achieve an intended accountability by the 
Bangladeshi corporate sector. Instead, there could be unique institutional and 
cultural factors which may be able to further explain Bangladeshi firms. From 
a policy perspective, we believe the findings of this study can be helpful for a 
provision of additional insight to the regulators in their quest to harmonize 
the corporate governance practices in Bangladesh with international best 
practices. We suggest for further studies to be carried out by increasing the 
sample size and the consideration of institutional, cultural and industry 
specific factors in order to identify other influences.
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